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The United States Court of Military Appeals has long held that the Bill
of Rights applies to members of the armed forces except where explicitly
or implicitly inapplicable.' Ironically, despite the importance of the matter,
the court's holdings have never been confirmed by the Supreme Court.
Insofar as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, this situation was
highlighted recently by an unusual exchange among four members of the
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Lopez.2 In the process of
extending to commanders3 a "good faith exception" to the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule, four of the five judges discussed-and potentially
disagreed about-the applicability, or the nature of the applicability, of the
Fourth Amendment to the armed forces. Lopez thus posits a fundamental
question of constitutional law: Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the
armed forces, and, if so, how?4
© 1994 by Fredric I. Lederer and Frederic L. Borch. The views expressed in this
essay are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
.* Fredric Lederer is a Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the
College of William & Mary. A colonel in the United States Army Reserve, Judge Advo-
cate General's Corps, he was the principal author of the Military Rules of Evidence
discussed in this essay.
*** Frederic Borch is a student at the United States Army Command and General Staff
College. Major Borch, United States Army, Judge Advocate General's Corps, was a
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E.g., United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960).
2 35 M.J. 35 (C.M.A. 1992).
3 In the area of search and seizure, commanders have magisterial powers to grant the
military equivalent of search warrants, search authorizations. MIL. R. EVID. 315(b)(I).
' One might loosely divide searches and seizures in the armed forces into two
categories, traditional law enforcement-type activities and inspections. In the former case,
military law is very siinilar to that applied daily in the nation's civilian courts, with
perhaps the unique element that otherwise impartial military commanders may grant
search authorizations, i.e., warrants, upon a showing of probable cause. MIL. R. EVID.
315(d); see also MIL. R. EvID. 314 (non-probable cause searches). Military inspections
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In her lead opinion in Lopez, Judge Crawford wrote that the adoption
by the Manual for Courts-Martial 5 of the good-faith exception was "an
implicit recognition that the Supreme Court has never expressly applied the
Bill of Rights to the military, but has assumed they applied."' In support
of that proposition, Judge Crawford's footnote contained the following
quotation: "Scholars have differed as to whether the Bill of Rights does
apply to the armed forces. Strangely enough, in one sense the question
remains open. Although the Supreme Court has assumed that most of the
Bill of Rights does apply, it has yet to squarely hold it applicable." 7
are, as one might expect, numerous. In addition to inspections for personnel
accountability, condition of personal equipment, and health and welfare generally, military
inspections can extend to searches for weapons and drugs. Although the location and
removal of drugs is often justified on the grounds of the health and welfare of all
personnel affected, to say nothing of mission accomplishment, Captain Fredric I. Lederer
& Second Lieutenant Calvin M. Lederer, Marijuana Dog Searches After United States v.
Unrue, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1973, at 6, the resulting scope is far broader than would
ordinarily be countenanced in civilian society. In large measure, this Essay will
concentrate on military inspections, for even if the Fourth Amendment applies to military
searches and seizures for traditional, non-mission essential law enforcement purposes, it
is highly likely that inspections are either outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment or
are reasonable searches within its meaning.
5 The Manual for Courts-Martial is an executive order issued by the President pursuant
to both the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and Article 36(a)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provides:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising
under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military
tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President
by regulations which shall, so far as he considers. practicable, apply the principles
of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or
inconsistent with this chapter.
10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1988).
In 1980 the President promulgated the Military Rules of Evidence. The traditional
evidentiary provisions are nearly identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence, albeit with
a privilege codification. The Military Rules, however, also contain a unique codification
of the law of search and seizure, interrogation, and eye-witness identification. MIL. R.
EvID. 301-321. Binding rather than expository, the search and seizure rules were
designed in particular to supply certainty and predictability in those areas routinely
affecting law enforcement activities.
6 Lopez, 35 M.J. at 41 (citation omitted).
I1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE 26
(1991) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)), quoted in Lopez, 35 M.J. at 41 n.2.
The treatise continues:
Although disturbing, the Court's silence is only of academic interest, given that the
Court of Military Appeals held in 1960 in United States v. Jacoby that "the
protections of the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly, or by necessary
implication inapplicable, are available to members of the armed forces."
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Chief Judge Sullivan, although concurring in the result in Lopez,
disagreed with Judge Crawford's comments about the Fourth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights. He wrote:
I reject the suggestion or even the unintended implication
of the opinion that Manual rules provide the exclusive
protection to servicemembers from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Consequently, I could not find the purportedly
less demanding Manual rules dispositive of the accused's
Fourth Amendment claims. Instead, it is only where these
Manual rules fully satisfy the demands of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights as applied in the military context that
resolution of the accused's claims on this basis would be
appropriate.'
Despite the Chief Judge's strong language, his position has, at most,
limited support. He cites only a plurality opinion in Burns v. Wilson9 and
two Supreme Court remands to the Court of Military Appeals ordering that
court to reconsider cases "in light of" specified fourth amendment
cases.' o Consequently, his conclusion that "[t]he Supreme Court's express
direction to consider thosecases on the basis of its decisions applying the
Bill of Rights contradicts the implication of Judge Crawford's opinion
that these most precious and fundamental rights might not at all be
available to the American servicemembers[]" ' may be accurate, but it
need not be.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,12 in determining whether the Fourth Amendment applied to a
search and seizure of a non-resident alien outside the United States:
The Court of Appeals found some support for its holding in
our decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, . . . where a
majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment
applied to illegal aliens in the United States. We cannot
1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra, at 26 (citation omitted). It is misleading, however, to say
that the issue is only of academic interest. Lopez itself shows that the state of the Supreme
Court's decisional law may now be of practical importance.
8 Lopez, 35 M.J. at 48 (concurring opinion).
9 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (holding that federal civil courts may review due process claims
of military personnel), cited in Lopez, 35 M.J. at 48.
"o Lopez, 35 M.J. at 48 (citing Goodson v. United States, 471 U.S. 1063 (1985); Jordan
v. United States, 498 U.S. 1009 (1990)).
Id. at 49.
2 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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fault the Court of Appeals for placing some reliance on the
case, but our decision did not expressly address the
proposition gleaned by the court below. . . . The Court
often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while
assuming without deciding the validity of antecedent
propositions ... and such assumptions ... are not binding
in future cases that directly raise the questions. 3
These comments from the Chief Justice illustrate that remands "in light
of' propositions and assumptions hardly constitute express holdings. It
follows that while Chief Judge Sullivan may rely on such remands in
support of his view, the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to the military also properly may be considered an open question. As
Judge Wiss noted in Lopez, the Court of Military Appeals "quite clearly
has applied the pertinent portions of the Bill of Rights."' 4 His statement,
however, that "I must reject the implication that this assumed application
of the Bill of Rights has somehow left the question open '"15 is unjustified,
as demonstrated above. Further, as Judge Wiss conceded, notwithstanding
the Court of Military Appeals' demonstrated dedication, ability, and
specialized knowledge, whether the Fourth Amendment-or any part of the
Bill of Rights-applies to the armed forces is ultimately the decision of the
Supreme Court.'6 Consequently, although the Court of Military Appeals
may be unwilling to reconsider its precedents, the Supreme Court has yet
to resolve the issue for the first time.
II. THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
A thoughtful commentator might argue that there is no need for the
Supreme Court to decide how, and to what extent, the Fourth Amendment
applies to the armed forces. Cannot history and lower court
decisions-particularly those of the Court of Military Appeals-serve as
controlling precedent until the issue is otherwise decided by the Supreme
Court? To some extent this question can be answered simply from a
pragmatic policy position. The armed forces may wish a far broader scope
to search than now permitted.
13 Id. at 272 (citations omitted).
14 Lopez, 35 M.J. at 49.
15 Id.
16 Judge Wiss recognized this when he wrote, "Unless and until the Supreme Court
of the United States hold [sic] otherwise, the law of this Court closes this question."
[Vol. 3:1222
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN ARMED FORCES
From a jurisprudential view, the authors reply with the argument that
the Founding Fathers intended the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter of
constitutional questions. 7 Ultimate questions about the extent to which the
Bill of Rights, and particularly the Fourth Amendment, apply to those in
uniform are the responsibility of the Supreme Court to answer. Courts of
inferior jurisdiction may properly decide questions of constitutional
importance, but the ultimate decision should come from the one, and only,
court specifically established by the Framers.
Additionally, the majority of opinions expressly applying the Fourth
Amendment to the armed forces come not from an Article III court, but
from a lower court created by Congress under Article I. Again,
constitutional questions may be properly addressed by the United States
Court of Military Appeals and the Courts of Military Review, but they
must ultimately be resolved by the Supreme Court.
Might it also be argued, however, that even if the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to those in uniform is an open question, the issue
really is purely academic? Certainly, most aspects of the Bill of Rights
have been codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 8 or, via
Executive Order, the Military Rules of Evidence or the Rules for Courts-
Martial, and presumably are non-controversial. 9 No one seriously
contends that freedom of religion, due process of law, or the right against
self-incrimination-all guaranteed by the Bill of Rights-could be entirely
taken away from those in uniform by an Act of Congress or an Executive
Order. The lack of judicial decisions specifically guaranteeing these
rights to servicemembers does not mean that their existence is an open
question. Yet one cannot ignore the implications of the Supreme Court's
most recent analysis of the interrelation between the Constitution and
criminal law.
" Or at least the first members of the Supreme Court decided that the Founding
Fathers so intended when they established the legitimacy of judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
'8 E.g., the right against self-incrimination, U.C.M.J. art. 31(a), 10 U.S.C. § 831(a)
(1988); the right to rights warnings, U.C.M.J. art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b); and the right
against double jeopardy, U.C.M.J. art. 44, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1988).
19 Congress, however, could amend the Uniform Code if it so chose. On the other
hand, the right against self-incrimination was codified in the Articles of War at a time
when the Bill of Rights was thought inapplicable to the armed forces, and the military
rights warnings predate Miranda by 18 years. See generally Captain Fredric I. Lederer,
Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1976) (discussing
requirement of rights warnings in the military). There is no reason to believe that, freed
of constitutional requirement, Congress would abrogate those basic protections as a matter
of policy.
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In its January 1994 decision in Weiss v. United States,2 ° the Court held
that the absence of fixed terms of judicial office by military judges who
are rated by military superiors did not violate due process. In holding that
the Congressional "balance between independence and accountability"
did not violate due process, the Court emphasized the deference it accords
Congress insofar as the rights of service personnel are concerned:
[W]e have recognized in past cases that "the tests and
limitations [of due process] may differ because of the mili-
tary context." . . . The difference arises from the fact that
the Constitution contemplates that Congress has "plenary
control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the frame-
work of the Military Establishment, including regulations,
procedures, and remedies related to military discipline."
... Judicial deference thus "is at its apogee" when re-
viewing congressional decisionmaking in this area.... Our
deference extends to rules relating to the rights of service-
members: "Congress has primary responsibility for the
delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against
the needs of the military. . . .We have adhered to this
principle of deference in a variety of contexts where ... the
constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated." 21
The due process test applied by the Court in Weiss was, "'whether the
factors mitigating in favor [of a right] are so extraordinarily weighty as to
overcome the balance struck by Congress. '"'22 At the very least, Weiss
suggests that Congress may well have the authority to enact military search
and seizure legislation that would be unconstitutional if applied to
civilians.23
20 No. 92-1482, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1137 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1994). The decision in Weiss
addressed two cases, Weiss, which concerned the legality of the appointment of the
military judiciary under the Constitution's Appointments Clause, and Hernandez v. United
States, which held that the lack of a fixed tenure by the military judiciary did not violate
due process.
21 Id. at *26-27 (citations omitted).
22 Id. at *27-28 (quoting Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976) (holding that
personnel appearing before a summary court-martial did not have a right to counsel)).
23 As discussed infra part III, authorization of wide-ranging military inspections might
be an appropriate subject for such legislation. Military law permits inspections to uncover
unlawful weapons and drugs, MIL. R. EVID. 313(b), but conditions the right of command-
ers to conduct such inspections. MIL. R. EvID. 314, 315. Congress might wish to provide
for unconstrained inspections.
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If the Fourth Amendment either does not apply to the armed forces or
applies in some minimal fashion, Military Rules of Evidence 311 to 317
could be rewritten to provide commanders with vastly increased search
powers and greater flexibility,24 even absent Congressional action.
Litigation of search and seizure issues would presumably drop sharply.
Senior commanders might even show greater interest in treating
inappropriate privacy intrusions as command and leadership failures 25
rather than regarding them as "lawyer matters."
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LIKELY DOES NOT APPLY FULLY TO THE
ARMED FORCES
When debating the application of the Fourth Amendment to the
military, the clearest issue is the application of the Amendment to
inspections. Military Rule of Evidence 313 controls the admissibility of
evidence or contraband found during a military inspection. This inspection
is a search, for individuals and their property are involuntarily examined
and searched. Yet, whether viewed historically or as a matter of social
policy, it is by no means clear that a military inspection is a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The intent of the Framers, the language of the amendment
itself, and the nature of military life render the application
of the Fourth Amendment to a normal inspection
questionable. As the Supreme Court has often recognized,
the "military is, 'by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society."' . . . As the Supreme Court
noted . . . "Military personnel must be ready to perform
their duty whenever the occasion arises. To ensure that they
always are capable of performing their mission promptly
and reliably, the military services 'must insist upon a
respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in
civilian life."' . . . An effective armed force without
inspections is impossible-a fact amply illustrated by the
24 Whether this is desirable is a matter of policy. Judge Cox's oft-expressed interest
in such an outcome, see, e.g, United States v. Morris, 28 M.J. 8, 14, 17-19 (C.M.A.
1989), demonstrates that such a position can be and is held by responsible individuals who
cannot be criticized as either unaware of fourth amendment law or insensitive to the
position's implications.
21 See infra note 59.
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unfettered right to inspect vested in commanders throughout
the armed forces of the world.26
Professor Lederer, the author of that statement, could have added that
if a purely historical-original intent-theory of constitutional interpretation
were applied, which is not uncommon in the area of fourth amendment
caselaw,27 inspections, at least, would not be regulated by the Fourth
Amendment as either the Fourth Amendment generally was not intended
to apply to the armed forces, or because military inspections would not
have been within its ambit. The authors have not conducted research into
the operation of the colonial militia and the Army of the 1770s and 1780s.
Edward M. Coffman's The Old Army, an authoritative secondary source
on the American Army between 1784 and 1898, indicates, however, that
the Fourth Amendment had little or no importance in early court-martial
28practice. Additionally, Frederick B. Wiener, a retired judge advocate and
perhaps the nation's preeminent military legal scholar, writes that the
"actualities of military life in the decade or so after the adoption of the
Constitution utterly negative any notion that the first American soldiers
were shielded against searches of any kind." '29 Since the Supreme Court
did not give content to the Fourth Amendment in civilian criminal law
until 1886,30 and the concept of excluding evidence obtained through an
illegal search first appeared in 1914,31 it is not at all certain that the
Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to apply to the armed forces.
Rather, it is likely that the historical record will show that at the time the
Bill of Rights was written and ratified, military commanders had unfet-
26 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1984, A22-19, A22-20 (analyzing
Military Rule of Evidence 313) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL] (citations
omitted).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment [does not apply] to the search and seizure by United States agents of
property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country."); United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (alternative holding that inasmuch as
the "lineal ancestor" of the instant statute (permitting the Coast Guard to search vessels)
was enacted by the same Congress that "promulgated the Bill of Rights," Congress
clearly did not regard this type of search as unreasonable); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) (holding that warrants are not necessary for arrests).
28 EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE OLD ARMY 21-25 (1986).
29 Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice 11, 72 HARV. L. REV. 266, 272 (1958) (citation omitted).
30 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that compulsory production of
private books and papers for use against the owner violated Fourth and Fifth
Amendments).
31 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (finding that improperly seized papers
may not be held or used at trial).
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tered authority to search their personnel for military-related purposes. If
this is true, a theory of original intent would inescapably yield the
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not affect ordinary military
practice.
Application of the contemporary emphasis on the reasonableness of a
search or seizure32 would likely yield a similar result, at least insofar as
military inspections are concerned. Certainly, a Katz33-related policy
analysis would reinforce this conclusion. The often smaller, if not
sometimes de minimis, expectation of privacy held by military personnel,
coupled with the substantial social policy justification for privacy
intrusions in the military framework, would at least justify a sharply
different manner of fourth amendment application to the military when
compared to its civilian application.34
Ironically, in its 1993 decision in United States v. McCarthy,35 the
Court of Military Appeals, holding that the Fourth Amendment did not
require the equivalent of arrest warrants for apprehensions 36 in barracks, 37
determined that military personnel do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in military barracks.38 In large measure the court determined that
any expectation of privacy would be unreasonable given the unique nature
and needs of military life. 39 Although McCarthy was limited to whether
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in barracks for purposes of
apprehensions, the court's reasoning is fully consistent with a potential
holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a barracks for
purposes of other searches and seizures.40 Indeed, Judge Wiss, concurring
in the result in McCarthy, voiced his concern that the majority had held
32 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992) ("'[R]eason-
ableness is still the ultimate standard ... "') (citation omitted).
33 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding the use of an electronic listening
device in a phone booth without a warrant to be an unconstitutional search and seizure).
34 The nature of our armed forces might well play a significant role in the outcome.
A small volunteer professional force might implicate different values than a large drafted
force. On the other hand, a large group of conscripts may require more pervasive com-
mand presence and scrutiny, increasing the need for unfettered searches and seizures. In
a related vein, note that a "downsized" voluntary professional military may be
sufficiently distinguishable from the expansive drafted forces of yesteryear to permit a
knowing and voluntary waiver of any applicable fourth amendment rights upon entry.
3' 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993).
36 The military terminology for the civilian "arrest."
31 McCarthy, 38 M.J. at 400-01 (construing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980)).
38 Id. at 403.
39 Id. at 402.
40 An arrest or apprehension is, of course, a Fourth Amendment seizure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
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that there is "no reasonable expectation of privacy" rather than "a
reduced or different expectation."'" Thus in the limited area of barracks
inspections, the Court of Military Appeals may well be prepared to find
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.
Consequently, insofar as Military Rule of Evidence 313 is concerned,
depending on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the armed
forces, the President might choose to delete this provision altogether, since
its existence might not be constitutionally required. A similar analysis
might apply to other provisions of the Military Rules of Evidence
governing searches and seizures of persons and property.
IV. THE COX VIEW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE ARMED FORCES
As a member of the United States Court of Military Appeals, Judge
Cox's view of search and seizure in the armed forces is instructive.
Although Judge Cox has accepted the application of the Fourth
Amendment to the armed forces, he believes that its applicability to the
military should differ radically from its civilian application. In his
concurring opinion in Lopez, he complains of the way in which the Court
of Military Appeals has applied the Fourth Amendment: "For some time
now, I have been 'urg[ing] a fresh look at the proper application of the
Fourth Amendment to ... [military] society. '' 42 Judge Cox would apply
the Fourth Amendment to the armed forces, but he would apply it in a
unique fashion:
The Fourth Amendment only protects military members
against unreasonable searches within the context of the
military society. . . . Something as drastic as a "shakedown
inspection" can only be justified in the military because of
the overriding need to maintain an effective force.
Likewise, preemptive strikes on drugs and other dangers
can only be reasonable because of their impact on the
mission.... The United States Court of Military Appeals
has the obligation to ensure that inspections, searches, and
seizures in the military society are reasonable in their
inception and in their conduct. This means that commanders
must have rules which are honest, simple, forthright, and
41 McCarthy, 38 M.J. at 407. His opinion concludes, "TIhe repercussions of such a
broad holding are enormous." Id.
42 United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 42 (1992) (quoting United States v. Morris, 28
M.J. 8, 14 (C.M.A. 1989) (Cox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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easy for both the commander and the commanded to
understand.43
Whether Judge Cox is correct as a matter of policy is subject to
reasonable disagreement, and indeed the authors of this Essay may differ
between themselves on the point. Judge Cox's view, however, demon-
strates that the nature of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the
armed forces is subject to serious debate. Moreover, although Judge Cox
applies the Fourth Amendment to the armed forces, his focus on unit
mission and a commander's reasonableness as the benchmarks for deciding
the legality of a search or seizure means that he reaches the same result
that would be reached by a judge who ruled that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the armed forces.
A look at how Judge Cox applies the Fourth Amendment to command-
directed military inspections illustrates this point. In his concurring opinion
in United States v. Alexander," he writes that:
[A]ny threat to combat effectiveness or mission pre-
paredness provides a legitimate basis for inspection ...
[Furthermore,] any time a commander's probing actions
relate directly to the ability of an individual or organization
to perform the military mission . . . we have a pre-
sumptively valid military inspection. It does not matter
whether the commander has reason to suspect that the
individual or unit will fail the inspection.45
Judge Cox further writes that if a commander suspects that a soldier is
a drug user, she may order a urinalysis of only that soldier, and the order
would be a lawful inspection if done "to protect the safety and readiness
of [her] personnel. ' 46 This example illustrates that although Judge Cox
applies the Fourth Amendment in measuring the legality of command-
directed military inspections, the practical effect of this application rarely
will differ from the practical effect resulting from not applying the Fourth
Amendment to the armed forces. It follows that there is an ongoing need
41 Id. at 45; see also United States v. McCarthy, 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993); United
States v. Holloway, 36 M.J. 1078, 1091-94 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993) (en banc) (Lawrence and
Orr, JJ., dissenting).
44 34 M.J. 121 (C.M.A. 1992).
4" Id. at 127 (Cox, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also TJAGSA Practice Note,
Can the Government Ever Satisfy the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Under
Military Rule of Evidence 313(b)?, ARMY LAW., June 1992, at 33.
46 Alexander, 34 M.J. at 128.
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to clarify a most fundamental question: Does the Fourth Amendment apply
to the armed forces and, if so, how and to what extent?
V. OBTAINING SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Presenting this issue to the Supreme Court for resolution has appeared
hopeless because of a single insurmountable obstacle, the Military Rules
of Evidence. Given the Section III codification of the law of search and
seizure in the Rules, 47 any attempt to appeal a defense-oriented fourth
amendment decision to the Supreme Court would almost certainly be
resolved on the grounds that the Rules present an adequate and
independent grounds for decision. The President surely can provide
servicemembers with rights beyond those minimally guaranteed by the
Constitution. Abrogation of the Rules is highly undesirable, however, from
a policy and efficiency perspective. Notwithstanding Judge Cox's attempt
to urge use of Military Rule of Evidence 314(k), basically a provision
permitting the use of any new type of non-probable cause search declared
constitutional by the Supreme Court, as a blanket escape clause to the
Rules,4 8 Rule 314(k) ordinarily is of no avail.49
47 See generally Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origin and
Judicial Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1990) (discussing the Military Rules of
Evidence, their drafting, and their implementation).
48 Indeed, Mil. R. Evid. 314(k) itself contains the exception that swallows these
"rules," stating, "A search of a type not otherwise included in this rule and not
requiring probable cause under Mil. R. Evid. 315 may be conducted when permissible
under the Constitution of the United States as applied to members of the armed
forces."
United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 45 n.3 (C.M.A. 1992).
49 Contrary to Judge Cox's assertion that Rule 314(k) provides what might be called
a "near miss" exception to the rules, Rule 314(k)'s emphasis is on the word "type."
If a non-probable cause search of a type not codified is involved, Rule 314(k) permits an
otherwise constitutional search. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 26, at
A22-24, A22-26. Most normal types of search are codified, and inspections and
inventories are dealt with expressly in Rule 313. It follows that Judge Cox's conclusion
that "the results of constitutional searches are not subject to exclusion under the Military
Rules of Evidence," Lopez, 35 M.J. at 46, is simply wrong. If the Supreme Court were
to determine, for example, that vehicle searches did not require probable cause, a new type
of search would be born, and Rule 314(k) would apply. A pro-prosecution change,
however, in searches incident to a lawful apprehension, see MIL. R. EvID. 314(g), would
not be adopted via Rule 314(k). That type of search has been codified. The authors
concede that Professor Lederer's interpretation of the provision may be affected by his
status as its drafter, but believe that the plain meaning, framework, and intent behind Rule
314, see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 26, at A22-24, and its provisions
substantiate our plain meaning and legislative intent interpretation.
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There is, however, a mechanism to present this issue to the Supreme
Court, a mechanism that depends somewhat ironically on the very same
Rule 314(k) upon which Judge Cox has placed such great emphasis.
Military Rule of Evidence 315 codifies the law pertaining to probable
cause searches. Rule 315(a) declares, "Evidence obtained from searches
requiring probable cause conducted in accordance with this rule is
admissible at trial when relevant and not otherwise inadmissible under
these rules." 5 ° Military Rule of Evidence 311 (a) declares as inadmissible
only the results of an "unlawful search or seizure, ' 51 and "unlawful"
is defined for searches conducted by military personnel and their agents as
a search "in violation of the Constitution . . .as applied to members of
the armed forces'.., or Military Rules of Evidence 312-317. "52 If a
military search of a type that would require probable cause when
conducted in civilian life is executed, and the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to the armed forces, that search will not require probable cause. 53 It
follows that Rule 315 drops out of the equation, and the search is lawful
under the Rule 314(k) escape clause. Consequently, the Supreme Court can
be clearly presented with a fundamental constitutional issue which would
not be rendered moot by the Military Rules of Evidence.54
Constitutional clarification of this matter necessarily requires Supreme
Court decision. Accordingly, the authors of this Essay recommend that the
government seek writs of certiorari from the Court of Military Appeals in
an inspection case and in a case in which probable cause would be
necessary in civilian life and in which that cause is clearly lacking. The
Supreme Court's willingness to grant certiorari in appropriate military
cases is illustrated by the fact that it will have heard three military cases
in its October 1993 term.
50 MIL. R. EvID. 315(a).
" MIL. R. EVID. 311(a).
52 MIL. R. EvID. 311(c)(1).
" One possible example would be the United States search of a foreign dwelling
inhabited by an American servicemember. Cf. United States v. Chapple, 36 M.J. 410
(C.M.A. 1993) (extending good faith exception to a commander's authorization to search
a foreign civilian dwelling outside his control). See generally Major Borch, TJAGSA
Practice Note, COMA Further Extends the Good-Faith Exception: United States v.
Chapple, ARMY LAW., July 1993, at 39 (discussing broadening of good faith exception in
Chapple).
" Interestingly, the recent decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States
v. McCarthy, 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993), holding that the military equivalents of arrest
warrants are not required for apprehensions in barracks, see supra text accompanying
notes 35-41, would be an adequate vehicle if appealed by the defense.
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The authors do not recommend that Staff Judge Advocates55 or
prosecutors intentionally advise commanders or law enforcement personnel
to conduct searches which are undoubtedly unlawful under current law so
as to establish test cases. Such conduct may be unethical. Rule 3.1 of both
the ABA's Model Rules and the Army's Rules of Professional Conduct
for Lawyers, for example, permits bringing a proceeding or asserting an
issue "which includes a good faith argument for ... reversal of existing
law. ' 5 6 The intentional creation of a test case, however, with advice to
military law enforcement that clearly contradicts not only the consistent
holdings of the United States Court of Military Appeals, but also the
Military Rules of Evidence, is at least troubling. Perhaps more importantly,
the Military Rules of Evidence are in one sense an order of the President,
the Commander-in-Chief, and it would be inappropriate to intentionally
violate such a directive.57 This type of test case is unnecessary in any
event; there are sufficient erroneous searches to provide an appropriate
vehicle.58
VI. CONCLUSION
It is incredible that in the late twentieth century, it is not absolutely
known whether the Bill of Rights, and in particular the Fourth
Amendment, apply to those sworn to defend it. If it does not, then either
the President or Congress should act to protect the rights and interests of
5 Staff Judge Advocates are legal advisers to commanders.
56 ARMY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS Rule 3.1 (1992).
" This does suggest that the President could set the stage for an appropriate challenge
simply by amending the Military Rules of Evidence. This could be done. However, given
the time lag between the effective date of a rules amendment and resolution of an
appropriate case by the Supreme Court, an invalid amendment to the Rules would
unnecessarily affect adversely the rights of numerous personnel and mandate the reversal
of what potentially might be a large number of courts-martial convictions.
5' See supra note 53 for an example of the type of case suitable for appeal to the
Supreme Court. A case in which evidence is admitted on an inevitable discovery theory
also might be suitable for appeal. For example, assume a military police officer searches
an accused's motor vehicle for contraband. The car is legally parked on post, in the unit
parking lot. The MP lacks probable cause to search, however, since it is only rumored that
the accused's car contains contraband. At trial the contraband discovered and seized from
the accused's vehicle is admitted under an inevitable discovery theory. The Court of
Review affirms on this basis. The Court of Military Appeals reverses, holding that as a
matter of law the facts developed at trial are inadequate to make inevitable discovery
applicable. In this example, the search of a civilian car requires probable cause, and absent
the application of inevitable discovery, the search is unlawful. If the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the armed forces, however, Military Rules of Evidence 311, 314, and
315 will operate to make the search lawful and the contraband admissible.
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our citizen soldiers in a way that adequately balances their interests and
those of national security.59 Further, if the Fourth Amendment does apply
but in a fashion far more flexible than previously thought, 60 the President's
representatives ought to have that knowledge in order to fashion the most
flexible search and seizure rules that are consistent with public policy and
the needs of our military personnel.
'9 Although we think that some type of search and seizure regulation is necessary, we
note then Chief Judge Everett's remarks that:
In promulgating paragraph 152 of the [ 1951 & 1969] Manual the President may also
have recognized that inherent in the command structure are some safeguards against
a commander's indiscriminate invasion of the privacy of his subordinates. For one
thing, combat readiness of troops depends in large part upon their motivation, but
discipline and punishment cannot alone develop the necessary motivation. Leader-
ship is also required, and one aspect of successful leadership is concern for the
welfare of subordinates. Loyalty in a military unit, as in other organizations, is a
two-way street. A commander who approves--or even tolerates-arbitrary invasions
of the privacy of his subordinates is not demonstrating the brand of leadership likely
to command the loyalty or produce the high morale associated with a combat-ready
organization. Accordingly, a commander has some incentive to act reasonably and
with sound judgment in acting on requests for searches and seizures which involve
his personnel. Moreover, repeated failures by a commander to respect the Fourth
Amendment rights of his troops might become a basis for a "complaint of
wrongs" under Article 138 of the Uniform Code .... or, in the extreme case, even
for a prosecution for dereliction of duties as a commander.
Lopez, 35 M.J. at 44-45 (Cox, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J.
347, 359-60 (C.M.A. 1981) (Everett, C.J.)).
Of course, it is clear that in promulgating the Military Rules of Evidence, the President
has assumed that the Fourth Amendment, and the Bill of Rights generally, apply to the
armed forces. It also may be argued that the Military Rules of Evidence generally reflect
a proper balance between the needs of the armed forces and that of their soldier citizenry.
That said, however, the Military Rules of Evidence may be changed by the President at
any time. If the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the armed forces, there is no
constitutional check on any such change.
6 The Supreme Court need not resolve the Fourth Amendment question on a "yes or
no basis." It could well decide that mission related searches and seizures
("examinations") are not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, while pure
searches for evidence of crime are.
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